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Abstract. Introduction. In today’s globalising world, science acquires a cru-
cial importance: integrating humanity within the framework of solving global 
problems, it becomes one of the leading factors in social development, facilitating 
work and diversifying leisure time, as well as serving as an instrument of trans-
formations in the political sphere. Undoubtedly, the social aspects of contempo-
rary science are capturing the attention of a huge number of researchers. How-
ever, it is not clear that all areas of the sociology of science treat the object of their 
study in the same way. 
Aim. A lack of reflection on the unity or otherwise in the understanding of 
the essence of science in the various fields of sociological research makes it diffi-
cult to compare different theories of the institutional, cultural, social and com-
municative contexts of scientific development. An urgent methodological task 
therefore consists in developing an understanding of the various definitions of the 
concept of “science” used in the framework of contemporary sociological analysis 
of this phenomenon. 
Results and scientific novelty. In this paper, two dominant sociological views 
on science – as an experimental-mathematical approach to cognising the world 
and as a system of representations in general – are compared. We conclude that 
while researchers studying institutional aspects of science tend to interpret it in 
terms of the “heritage” of post-Enlightenment European rationalism, construc-
tionist and communicatively-oriented researchers tend to approach science as the 
system of knowledge and cognition that is formed in any human society, having 
its own specific sociocultural features in each respective case. While each of these 
two approaches undoubtedly has its own methodological potential, in order to 
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provide such a diverse field of studies with a common ground, it would be neces-
sary to balance them with a third aspect. We argue that this balancing role, since 
both common for all mankind and unique for every culture, could be played by 
Heidegger’s conceptualisation of science as “the theory of the real”. 
Practical significance. In order to avoid a pluralism of incompatible theories, 
it is important to continually pose the question “what is the object of study when 
conducting a sociological study of various scientific phenomena?” – as well as to 
understand the “limits of applicability” of the particular interpretation of science 
on which basis sociological analysis proceeds. 
Keywords: sociology of science, social institutions of science, generation of 
scientific knowledge, concept of science, philosophy of science, experimental and 
mathematical knowledge, knowledge system, theory of the real. 
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Аннотация. Введение. В современном глобализующемся мире научные 
знания приобретают все большую значимость: они интегрируют усилия чело-
вечества для решения общих проблем, становятся одними из ведущих факто-
ров развития общества, облегчают труд и разнообразят досуг людей. Кроме 
того, они используются и в качестве инструмента социально-политических 
трансформаций. Не случайно сегодня внимание огромного количества иссле-
дователей приковано к социальным аспектам науки, а также образования 
как важнейшего взаимосвязанного с ней социального института. 
Однако вопрос о том, все ли направления социологии науки трактуют 
объект своего изучения одинаково, остается открытым. Между тем практиче-
ски полное отсутствие рефлексии по поводу единства в понимании существа 
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науки в поле социологических исследований затрудняет сопоставление раз-
личных теорий развития научного знания в институциональном, культурном, 
социально-коммуникативном контекстах. Такое положение дел актуализирует 
поиск решения одной из центральных методологических задач по осмысле-
нию вариантов определения понятия «наука», используемых в рамках совре-
менного социологического анализа данного феномена. 
Цель публикации заключается в попытке сопоставить основные трак-
товки науки – как экспериментально-математического способа познания ми-
ра и как системы представлений о существующих реалиях. 
Результаты и научная новизна. В ходе обсуждения проблемы авторы 
приходят к выводу о том, что исследования, посвященные изучению инсти-
туциональных аспектов, тяготеют к пониманию науки как рационалистиче-
ского «наследия» Европы Нового времени, а конструкционистски и коммуни-
кативистски ориентированные течения склонны рассматривать ее как систе-
му знания и познания, которая формируется в любом человеческом сообще-
стве, имея, однако, в каждом случае свои специфические социокультурные 
черты. Каждое из двух указанных направлений, несомненно, обладает своим 
методологическим потенциалом. Тем не менее в целях выведения таких раз-
ноплановых исследований на единую почву предлагается уравновесить их 
третьей точкой зрения, согласно которой наука есть «теория действительного», 
имеющая черты универсально-общечеловеческого и уникально-культурного 
феномена. 
Практическая значимость. Ответ на вопрос: «Что мы изучаем, когда 
проводим социологическое исследование науки?» позволит избежать плюра-
лизма несопоставимых теорий и понять «границы применимости» той трак-
товки науки, от которой мы отталкиваемся в социологическом анализе. 
Ключевые слова: социология науки, институты науки, генерация на-
учного знания, понятие науки, философия науки, экспериментально-матема-
тическое познание, система знаний, теория действительного. 
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Introduction 
In today’s globalising world, social aspects of the phenomenon of sci-
ence, including its institutional specificity and the laws governing the genera-
tion of scientific knowledge, have become one of the leading subjects of re-
search across a wide range of sociological disciplines, including social psy-
chology, social philosophy, social epistemology, ethics and scientometrics. 
However, it is not entirely clear that it is the same “science” that is being 
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studied in all cases. Evidently, even among prominent sociologists and phi-
losophers of science, there continues to be a lack of unity on this issue. For 
example, Bruno Latour, through the activity of “following around” [1] the 
practitioners of science, focuses solely on the representatives of natural and 
technical sciences (STEM1), whereas Michel Foucault, in excavating the “ar-
chaeology of knowledge”, examines the foundations of the historical trans-
formation of socio-cultural codes on the example of the humanities [2]. And if 
Latour’s theory lacks applicability to the social organisation of philosophical 
and social humanitarian studies, as well as being limited in terms of its time 
frame to the contemporary stage of “big science”, Foucault’s conclusions, by 
contrast, are productive for understanding the developmental patterns of the 
system of knowledge and cognitive toolkit in general, since being formed on 
the ground of variously contrasting cultural and historical locales. 
When surveying the field of contemporary sociology of science, what 
can be observed about the different interpretations of science? The positions 
of Robert Merton’s well-known “ethos of science” [3] and the “Matthew effect” 
[4] are based on ideas derived from Western rationality. In his epistemological 
research, David Bloor rediscovers the world of culture and the “social compo-
nent” standing between the knowing subject (cogito) and the object of knowl-
edge [5, pp. 18, 28]; accordingly, the formation of scientific knowledge across 
different historical epochs necessarily varies. From a neo-Marxist position, 
Jürgen Habermas shows how science and its technical applications have be-
come a new ideology, facilitating the manipulation of mass consciousness by 
extending the promise of a comfortable, secure existence [6]. In his analysis of 
the organisation of a contemporary university, Steve Fuller remarks on the 
entrepreneurial nature of contemporary social knowledge production [7] (see 
also [8]). Then, can all these diverse research approaches be discussing the 
same “science”? Or is it rather the case that actor-network theory, structural 
functionalism, social constructionism, interactionism, communicativism and 
other areas of contemporary sociology of science each start from a different 
understanding of the phenomenon of science? 
While it may not be appropriate to speak about a pluralism of concepts 
of science in this field, it is evident that different aspects of the sociological 
study of science may be distinguished. Moreover, in focusing on empirical 
material, researchers often fail to elucidate their basic understanding of sci-
ence, in the light of which they nevertheless propose a development model, a 
classification of types of knowledge or a scheme of social management. This, 
                                                 
1 Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics. 
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of course, complicates an attempt to compare different positions, as well as 
raising the question of the truth value of any knowledge generated. The more 
controversies swirl around problems concerning the production of scientific 
knowledge, publication ethics and the historical transformation of science, as 
well as cultural conditionality, social and communicative aspects, etc. [9–22], 
more important it becomes to understand what we have in mind when we are 
talking about science. In this context, the necessity for a methodological sys-
tematisation of the conceptualisations of “science” being actively used by con-
temporary researchers becomes clear. In this paper, however, rather than set-
ting out to find the most “correct” definition of science or striving to provide a 
common denominator to existing definitions (science as knowledge produc-
tion, cognitive process, means of achieving practical benefits, type of cultural 
activity, social and institutionalised phenomenon, way of achieving truth, ed-
ucational level, branch of knowledge, etc.), we aim to highlight a possible 
ground of unity capable of supporting interpretations that define the essence 
of contemporary science. In this vein, two understandings of science are com-
pared: (1) science as an emergent phenomenon reflecting the essence of Western 
rationality; and (2) science as continuum of social phenomena inherent to – and 
determined by – the specific culture in which they are manifested. By way of a 
conclusion, a third approach is proposed in which differences between these two 
understandings are partially resolved, with science being seen a human activity 
resulting in a theoretical representation of reality. 
First aspect: Science as the heritage of post-
Enlightenment Western European thought 
When posing the question of when science became what it is today – with 
its empiricism, mathematisation and unprecedented penetration into all 
spheres of society – the Enlightenment foundations of contemporary European 
thought are never far away. The consideration of science in the light of such ra-
tionalistic bases typically begins with Immanuel Kant, who pointed out that, by 
the turn of the 17th century, mathematics had already been established as the 
fundamental language of naturalistic description and experiment as the pre-
eminent method for revealing knowledge [23, p. 99–124]. Reflecting on the his-
torical development of science, Kant makes the following observations: 
1. All previous eras, beginning with Ancient Egypt and Greece, are con-
ceived as preparatory stages for the scientific rationality of the Modern era; in 
other words, sciences are developing in a movement from unsystematic ob-
servations and random experiments to a more ordered system of knowledge, 
i.e. in a progressive direction (Kant even observes that “mathematics was left 
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groping about for a long time” [23, p. 107]). In this connection, it is notable 
that the majority of subsequent thinkers consider science precisely in terms 
of that progress and ordering that brings humanity closer to true knowledge. 
2. The revolutions that periodically occur in the sciences are thus seen 
as virtues that lead to breakthroughs in revelation of the truth [23, pp. 107–
109]. The perception of the development dynamics of science as taking a revo-
lutionary and / or saltatory form is prevalent in most related concepts within 
the philosophy of science today. 
3. According to Kant, the primary science, towards which all natural 
sciences should be oriented, is mathematics, since this form of knowledge is 
constructed entirely a priori in the mind, based on pure contemplations in 
and of space and time [23, p. 107]. Thus, natural sciences should proceed on 
the model of mathematics, constructing hypotheses and working through 
their implications by means of experiments [23, p. 109]. 
From the late 19th through into the 20th century, positivists and neo-
Kantians continued the Kantian approach in the philosophy of science, con-
sidering its development in terms of “from the lowest to the highest”. This was 
also facilitated by the dissemination of the ideas of historicity and evolution-
ism inherent in the philosophical concepts of Georg Hegel, Karl Marx and 
Charles Darwin. In addition, the lightning-fast successes of the technical ap-
plication of the scientific achievements of the 17th–18th centuries so deci-
sively overshadow the achievements of previous periods that the existence of 
science as a holistic phenomenon is only acknowledged from the 17th cen-
tury onwards (see also [24]). 
Significantly, Kant warns against constructing social sciences and hu-
manities in the image and likeness of natural science, since sciences con-
cerned with the life of the human soul cannot have the same methods as 
those whose object of study is nature [23, p. 115–117; 25]. Nevertheless, the 
pursuit of a non-dual picture of the world, supported by practical advances in 
the exact sciences, formed new ideals and resulted in the positivistic ap-
proach becoming increasingly popular [26]. Thus, already by the beginning of 
the 20th century, mathematical methods of cognition were beginning to be 
applied in social humanitarian studies, having significantly pushed back 
against descriptive and intuitive-analytical approaches. As a result, despite 
the criticisms of this interpretation from phenomenological quarters [27; 28, 
p. 6], most contemporary researchers still rely on an understanding of sci-
ence as the experimental-mathematical method of rational cognition of the 
world that arose in the Modern era. 
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Second aspect: Cultural specificity of science 
as a system of knowledge 
The aforementioned understanding of science as a recent phenomenon 
having arisen in the European context raises a reasonable question about the 
Eurocentrism of science as such [29]. In the contemporary world, not everyone 
agrees with the majority position of Western researchers; this disagreement 
may be expressed in the laconic phrase of Hans-Georg Gadamer “the scien-
tific character, in the name of which we ask our questions, is itself a Western 
invention” [30, p. 27]. Thus, representatives of other cultures may reasonably 
object that those integral elements on which basis contemporary Western cul-
ture asserts its primacy had already arisen in other cultural and historical 
contexts long before the 17th century. For example, mathematics, astronomy, 
chemistry and pharmaceuticals were being developed in Ancient Egypt and 
Mesopotamia between 6000 and 4000 BC. Similar examples can be cited from 
the history of ancient China and India, Arab countries and the civilisational 
empires of the Americas. Such historical facts concerning scientific knowl-
edge and the technological achievements of a number of different civilisations 
against the background of the globalisation processes of the 20th century led 
many thinkers, including Westerners, to consider science as a phenomenon 
that arises in human culture, taking distinct conceptual and methodological 
forms in different societies. Clearly, it would be impossible to base an identifi-
cation of such cultural-historical specifics on a narrow understanding of sci-
ence as logically-formalised mathematical-experimental research, the meth-
odology of which is determined by strict adherence to the principle of scepti-
cal doubt in everything, which supposedly lies at the basis of contemporary 
European rationality [31]. 
Thus, the simultaneous appeal to science both as a culturally-conditi-
oned phenomenon and as a universal form of activity common to all mankind 
foregrounded the need to search for an alternative unified basis for its under-
standing. Researchers drew attention to the similarity of conscious structures 
and cognitive processes of all human beings, regardless of their ethnic, social 
and cultural identity [32]. However, the uniformity of structures of con-
sciousness reproduced on different cultural substrates cannot become a cri-
terion for the unity of science as a universal phenomenon, since, on the one 
hand, not all conscious (and unconscious) activity is reducible to scientific 
functions, and on the other, the content of scientific knowledge differs in dif-
ferent societies. 
In this respect, an interesting interpretation of the grounds of science 
was proposed by Michel Foucault in line with the postmodern idea of the dis-
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cursivity of a given culture. By questioning the accepted schemes of under-
standing science as a type of human activity based on the principles of logic, 
objectivity and rationality, Foucault traces the conditioning of scientific 
knowledge and scientific methodology to the type of culture in which knowl-
edge is formed. The very formulation of the question of science as a cultur-
ally-conditioned activity becomes possible only in the light of a meeting with 
the Other – in a broad sense, an encounter with a different culture and a dif-
ferent way of thinking [2, pp. xvi-xxvi]. Foucault supposes that scientific 
knowledge is formed through the innate predisposition of humankind towards 
order. The thinker refers to this order as having its basis in the “episteme”, 
i.e. a structure that functions as a means of organising cognitive practices. 
However, prior to the orders of different cultures and types of representations, 
there must be a fundamental order of reality that a person is not able to 
comprehend. Consequently, each order of representation remains incomplete 
and its inadequacy, when subjected to enquiry, is eventually revealed. There-
fore, Foucault claims, it is not possible to say that science develops in a linear 
progression; rather, cultural-historical epochs are incomparable, since each 
develops according to its own epistemic structure. 
However, it was not only postmodernists like Foucault who were en-
gaged in understanding science as characteristic of any particular society, but 
at the same time reflecting its cultural specificity and approaches to cognition. 
Many other notable thinkers have also remarked on the apparent fact that, 
along with rational processes, knowledge creation is often accompanied by ir-
rational moments (intuition, insight), [33–36]. Indeed, even in the light of the 
understanding of science as an objective type of human activity relying on 
logical rules and empirical methods, it is still impossible to ignore the indi-
vidual researcher’s own subjective vision. After all, the selection of the object 
and the methodology of a study is necessarily dependant on the individual re-
searcher’s axiological guidelines and ethical attitudes, as well as on the forms 
of social organisation of science and the international political situation as it 
affects the particular society within which he or she works. In other words, 
this set of factors is entirely coloured by the cultural specificity of the individ-
ual researcher. Within the framework of this interpretation, science may be 
understood – along with art, philosophy and religion – as a culturally-specific 
type of human activity. 
Nevertheless, despite the methodological potential gained from consid-
ering science as a cultural phenomenon, in comparison with a rationalistic 
understanding, this interpretation lacks unity and clarity. The reason for this 
may be seen in the multiple interpretative permutations inherent in the con-
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nection between science and history, civilisation and culture. By the same to-
ken, to try to apply a unique unifying definition of these concepts would pre-
sent a huge – and probably unsolvable – problem. Moreover, due to the desire 
for inclusiveness, this perspective is forced to deal with the paradox of knowl-
edge and cognition. Any knowledge implies a certain fixity of the actual state 
of affairs and the concomitant collapsing of meaning into the form of a model. 
However, stable knowledge – for example, concerning the essence of motion 
(distinct from knowledge about how particular bodies move) – is fundamen-
tally unattainable (this ancient paradox also was noted by the ancient Greek 
thinkers Parmenides and Zeno). Along with the fundamental impossibility of 
fixing dynamic aspects of reality in the course of cognition, universality is 
also impossible as a consequence of human finitude. Since “everything” com-
prises an infinite set of unique things and processes, this infinity cannot be 
mastered by finite lives: at least, not by looking at the beginning of every-
thing, since everything always already happened as it did and not as it didn’t 
(see also [37]). Finally, within the framework of a culturally-specific view of 
science, it is difficult to solve the problem of demarcating the scientific from 
the unscientific. Each culture not only develops its own standards for deter-
mining the truth value of knowledge – as well as its own research methods 
and the corresponding forms knowledge takes – but also institutionalises 
cognitive activity into that culture’s intrinsic structures. Consequently, even 
when located far from the “traditional” (Eurocentric) understanding of scien-
tific knowledge, the scientific knowledge and cognitive activity of a given cul-
ture should be considered on an equal footing with all others. 
Third aspect: Science as “the theory of the real” 
Comparing the two aforementioned sociological views of science, let us 
consider what is the fundamental property without which an activity cannot 
be described as “science”. Firstly, it is important to note that the two above-
mentioned aspects of the understanding of the essence of science are not 
simple oppositions of views; rather, they reveal an underlying paradox. De-
spite their contrasting focal points, both positions view science as a holistic 
phenomenon – at the same time universal, since each participant aims at 
creating knowledge, and in particular, since the content-specificity of all sci-
entific research is affected by the unique culture, social structure and men-
tality of the researcher. Thus, in carrying out research activities, representa-
tives of quite distinct cultures are nevertheless able to comprehend each oth-
er as being involved in the same kind of work, as being cognisant of a com-
mon world on the basis of a number of varying existential grounds, but fol-
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lowing the same laws of the working of human consciousness, which, by its 
very nature, is capable of abstracting, generalising, discerning patterns in 
chaos; that is to say, thinking theoretically. 
By taking a phenomenological approach, it may possible to approach a 
finer distinction between science and non-science, since here it is we our-
selves as researchers who undergo the experience of science. For this pur-
pose, we may analyse with what (1) and how (2) science deals when forming 
knowledge: 
1) Science deals with reality-based objects. On the one hand, science is 
not limited to what is directly apprehended by human perception but is also 
capable of making an object of study of that which in the ordinary sense can-
not be said to exist (black holes, hole-type conductivity, the absence of verbal 
forms for some tenses in some languages, etc.) or the indiscernible as in the 
contradictory object of the human state (for example, the feeling expressed by 
an artist, which serves as the object for an observing psychologist). On the 
other hand, science occupies itself only with what is real. In this connection, 
even virtual reality is to some extent real, because it is part of our reality and 
influences it; consequently, such sciences as computer science, psychology or 
sociology are of no lesser interest to the scientist than natural reality. At the 
same time, scientists do not admit winged horses or fire-breathing dragons 
into reality other than in their capacity as objects of folklore in philology or 
aesthetic imagery in the study of art. 
2) Science deals with its objects by representing them (i.e. by placing 
them in front of itself). Whether it is a physician examining an individual pa-
tient, a chemist observing a particular reaction, a botanist studying a distinct 
variety of chamomile, etc., these phenomena are only subject to the interpre-
tation of scientists as a consequence of the latter already having an idea 
about the human body generally, about chemical reactions generally, about 
the corresponding type of plants generally, etc. Thus, science deals with the 
unique only in terms of a variation in the embodiment of the universal. More-
over, the universal (general) turns out to be more important for science than 
the unique (individual), with which everyone can only deal separately in his 
or her own “empirical” way. Even psychology, in its capacity as the “science of 
the soul”, only studies individual psychic phenomena to the extent that they 
conduce to deducing the general laws that are common to the functioning of 
any psyche. Even the study of unique events taking place in history or par-
ticular works of art is aimed at highlighting the general in each particular ex-
ample (for example, the repetitive “mechanism” of revolution or the character-
istic painting technique of a particular era or artist). 
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In other words, in highlighting the subject matter of reality for its 
study, science “sets it out” in front of itself, examining unique phenomena in 
order to identify features common to the series in which they are manifested. 
In order to apprehend the universal, it is necessary to present the objects in 
the light of theory, not just recreating the images, but as if weighing them 
against known forms. Between the researcher and the object of knowledge, 
appears a “screen” of generalised theoretical representation, which abstracts 
(isolates) the unique by imposing a constructed universal form onto it. Ac-
cording to Merab Mamardashvili, “it is only in the light of theory that some-
thing can have the value of an empirical fact, a clear empirical basis for our 
knowledge, with which they must necessarily correspond” [38, p. 75]. Thus, 
each concrete and unique horse is recognised in empirical experience pre-
cisely as a “horse” in terms of its abstract form (eidos, category, universal) 
and is studied in the sciences through the prism of many such universal con-
ceivable forms: as a species for a zoological researcher, as an organism for a 
veterinarian, as an image reproduced in a painting for an art historian, etc. 
In the theoretical space delineated by such universal forms, science al-
so works out its own idea of reality, by means of which activity knowledge is 
formed. In this case, the knowledge reflects the design, schema or model of a 
real object, but not the object itself in its entirety. From a number of each-ti-
me-unique phenomena, science takes a unique snapshot of the universal. In 
this way it becomes clear why science, in contrast to other forms of cognition, 
tends towards mathematical language: if a number represents the ultimate 
abstraction, then the ultimate appears in the general, which may be repre-
sented by a series of completely discrete objects. As Werner Heisenberg wrote, 
“a comparison of, say, three cows with three apples indicates their common 
characteristic, namely the one that is expressed by the word ‘three” [39, p. 
242]. Martin Heidegger speaks about the same thing: science, at least in its 
contemporary form, comprises the “picture of the world”, its presentation in 
the theoretical space and “universal scheme” of phenomena, i.e. “science is 
the theory of the real” [40, p. 157]. 
This definition of science is rooted in the ancient Greek word θεωρία 
(theory), which can be translated as “mental contemplation”. The connection 
between science and ancient Greek philosophy was formed during Antiquity, 
when, in line with the mentality and ontological intuitions of the Greeks, 
there was an understanding of the need and usefulness of special practices of 
mental contemplation. At that time, scientific knowledge was separated from 
unscientific δόξα (opinions) [41] and purely practical activities, which were 
not supported by a theoretical “knowledge of causes” [42]. However, the an-
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cient Greek origin of the word “theory” does not imply that the view of science 
as a theorising activity is derived solely from the traditions of the ancient Eu-
ropean world. On the one hand, it is undoubtedly the case when being guided 
by such a criterion that the epochs of Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Re-
naissance possessed their own distinct forms of science. On the other hand, 
the development of the theoretical component and the allocation on this basis 
of scientific knowledge within the framework of social institutions (scientific 
schools, communities of spiritual practitioners, priests) allows us to recognise 
the existence of science outside of Western cultural localities. Thus, it seems 
possible to say that, while science has developed on all continents in parallel 
with European history, in the current situation it is becoming increasingly 
obvious that science has its own socio-cultural specifics in different coun-
tries. 
Conclusion 
As is shown, the phenomenon of “science” can be interpreted in differ-
ent ways: 
1. On the one hand, it comprises a method of cognition based on the 
laws of logic and experimental evidence, striving for mathematical precision 
in the formulation of rational laws. This is the science that originated in 
Western Europe at the turn of the 16th–17th centuries and continued to de-
velop in its non-classical and post-non-classical variations. Thus, in their 
substantive focus on the study of the institutional organisation of research, a 
number of sociological approaches are based on the functional qualities of the 
elements of social and scientific subsystems. The use of mainly mathemati-
cal, statistical and quantitative methods allows researchers to model the pro-
cesses and trends of social interrelationships of scientists in the context of 
differences in accepted norms and ideals applying to scientific work, drawing 
conclusions about the dependence of the nature of production of scientific 
knowledge on the systemic features of the functioning of the scientific com-
munity and developing management recommendations for adjusting the rele-
vant systems. At the same time, society and the laws undergirding its exis-
tence are considered, in essence, by analogy with biological systems and the 
functioning of the organism, in which the sociological studies of the struc-
tural-functionalist are likened to the natural sciences both in terms of the ini-
tial set-up and the specific quantitative methodology used. This limits the ap-
plication of the research approach to “Western” science and its systems of or-
ganisation at the same time as prohibiting the application of this methodology 
to the study of the social existence of science affecting various types of cul-
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tures at macro-social scales). This feature also explains the interest of re-
searchers into this trend being mainly limited to the social existence of the 
natural and technical sciences, which more closely meets the criteria of ra-
tionality and empirical verifiability of the results of scientific activity. 
2. On the other hand, science can be understood as the quintessential 
form of human activity, consisting in the construction of knowledge about the 
world and its application in practice. While such science exists in any cul-
tural and historical locality, it can be loaded with mystical, mythological, reli-
gious and ideological contents. Contemporary researchers are in a position to 
classify such knowledge as unreliable. Nevertheless, it can be seen that belief 
in a knowledge system allows a person to derive benefit and signification from 
it, which is arguably more important for that person than the criteria of ob-
jectivity and rationality. In these circumstances, neither experimentation, 
mathematisation nor objectification can be regarded as unmistakable signs of 
science. Being based on such a broad understanding of science, constructiv-
ist and communicatively-oriented sociological concepts focus their attention 
primarily on the production of scientific knowledge. The construction of sci-
entific knowledge implies, on the one hand, an inevitable appeal to the social 
communication environment, in which context the ways of generating ideas 
about reality are established, and on the other, to a study of the distinctive 
features of the actors (participants) of these design processes. However, due 
to excessively broad interpretations of this conceptual corpus of science, 
knowledge, society, communication and language, questions arise concerning 
the initial “driving forces” of knowledge generation and its connection with the 
organisational forms taken by scientific activity, the boundary blurring effect 
applying to interlocutors in the area of communication, as well as the prob-
lem of demarcating science from other forms of cultural practices (ideological, 
mythological, religious, philosophical, etc.). As a result of the predominance 
of qualitative and descriptive research methods, based predominantly on tex-
tual analysis, as well as considering the cultural and linguistic knowledge de-
sign environment, quite general conclusions are formulated explaining both 
the macroscale of cross-cultural interaction, as well as processes taking place 
at the microsocial level of the formation of scientific teams and closed com-
munities of scientists, for which, in the absence of rigorous quantitative tools 
and clear predictions, these complex approaches are often criticised. 
3. These approaches to the study of the social aspects of the phenome-
non of science turn out to be at the same time complementary and mutually 
exclusive. Within the theoretical framework of scientists studying the interac-
tion, the question of the content of generated scientific knowledge remains 
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behind the scenes (it is often understood as a priori true and objective, de-
spite it being clear that not all the actual products of “scientific” labour con-
form to this description). In line with the second approach, when it is pre-
cisely the specificity of the collective production of knowledge and the de-
pendence of its contents on communicative reality that is the object of study, 
there is a tendency to blur the boundaries of the subject of cognition, result-
ing in a relativisation of the truth. Furthermore, as for example in the hu-
manities – philology, cultural studies, history, etc. – it seems perverse to re-
fuse to be scientific on the basis of a lack of mathematical apparatus, experi-
mentation or objectivity. Nevertheless, it is evident, on the one hand, that it is 
not only scientists, but also people who lack the official status of a scientist, 
who “do” science (i.e. strive to create genuine new knowledge); on the other 
hand, one cannot speak of the complete determination of knowledge by the 
social context, since a true scientist seeks and observes truth, even if ex-
pressing it in a special scientific language only comprehensible to his or her 
specialised community. Under conditions of necessity, the problem arises of 
how to choose between these theoretical and methodological systems – on the 
one hand, to embrace the processes occurring at the micro-, meso- and 
macro-social levels, and on the other, in a unified manner, clearly and in ac-
cordance with the phenomena of reality (and not idealised schemas), to un-
derstand the essence of the systems of organisation of science in their real, 
multifaceted socio-cultural being. Of course, this does not take away the sig-
nificance of previous studies; on the contrary, it allows us to find productive 
ideas and findings in each of them. In an attempt to balance between these 
two prevailing views, we posed the question: What is the sole prior condition, 
in the absence of which a given activity may not be termed ‘science’? And we 
have concluded that science is only possible in the presence of theory. If sci-
ence lacks a theoretical basis, then any mathematical calculations will re-
main an empty abstraction, experimental data will be baseless and objective 
laws will be scattered into fragments of private ideas. An understanding of 
science as “the theory of the real” (Heidegger) makes it possible to simultane-
ously demarcate its boundaries as a specific type of human activity, as well 
as to provide a rationale for the substantive differences between its various 
cultural and historical subtypes. 
We are of the view that all three outlined aspects of the consideration of 
science have methodological potential; however, with contextual limits being 
placed on their application in each case. Thus, for example, when studying con-
temporary scientific criteria or planning a natural scientific and /or technical re-
search project, it may be convenient to use the experimental-mathematical ap-
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proach to rational enquiry. Conversely, if the goal is to investigate the historical 
transformations of the content of knowledge, the differences in the social organi-
sation of the sphere of science, as well as its isolation from or fusion with other 
activities in a particular culture, then it may make more sense to interpret sci-
ence in a broader sense as a system of knowledge and cognitive activity taking 
place within a particular human society. Finally, if we consider the essence of sci-
ence not just as a set of knowledge and cognitive techniques, not only as a sys-
tem constructed in the language of mathematics and empirical research, but as 
something that is impossible outside the realms of theory, then a rather productive 
third perspective of the study of the phenomenon of science appears. This per-
spective takes into account both the socio-cultural conditionality of the content 
of scientific knowledge, arranged in the form of mental contemplation (theory), as 
well as the historical specificity of the transformation of ideas, social structures, 
cultural principles, language and methods, within which science develops as a 
living, paradoxical – at the same time unique and universal – phenomenon. In fu-
ture work, we will consider some of the practical consequences of a failure to re-
solve the Eurocentric and culture-specific interpretations of science in the con-
text of post-Soviet Russia’s strategic aim to integrate its science with the rest of 
the world given the growing dominance of English and associated problem of 
“linguistic imperialism”. 
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